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In countries where the black market premium on  counts carefully because creating such accounts
foreign exchange is exceptionally high, often  can raise the rate of inflation.
more than 100 percent, lowering the black
market rate to a level close to the market-  *  If govemments adopt a system with a fixed
determined official rate will improve the balance  and a floating rate, the floating rate should apply
of payments and increase exports. Floating the  to all commercial transactions and the fixed rate
currency to depreciate the real exchange rate and  to purely govemment transactions and interest
make exports more competitive can raise  payments on existing but not new debt.
inflation substanti-lly, however, as governmcnts
replace the lost revenue from exports. Inflation  *  Covemments tackling the black market
will occur even if real government spending  problem can speed up information to the bank-
remains constant unless there are new taxes or  ing network. Information on credit, trade, and
spending cuts to compensate for the loss of  prices is essential to market participants and
implicit export tax revenues.  enhances the goNvmment's  credibility  -an
essential factor in the reform process.
To avoid costly surges in inflation, exchange
rate reform may have to proceed slowly, other-  Once the government closes the spread
wise the depreciation is likely to meet with  between the official and black market rates, it
considerable political and social opposition as  faces a decision on whether to continue with a
inflation rises.  float permanently. evidence from developing
countries over the next few years should give
Some additional guidelines can ease the  some insights into this issue.
problems in countries moving from a fixed to a
floating exchange rate:
This paper is a background paper for the
* Legitimizing the black market so that it can  1988 World Development Report.  Copies are
take over commercial transactions could be an  available free from the World Bank, 1818 H
important step in the liberalizing process.  Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please
contact Rhoda Blade-Charest, room S13-060,
* Policymakers should weigh the decision to  extension 33754.
introduce foreign currency-denominated ac-
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Exchange  rate  reform  in  developing  countries  is  motivated  by the
related  goals  of improving  balance-of-payments  sustainability  and
increasing  exports. The  objectives  are  usually  to remove  distortions  in
relative  prices  and  choose  policies  aimrd  at depreciating  the  real  exchange
rate  in order  to  make  expcrts  more  competitive.
For  non-Franc  Zone  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  where  the  black
market  premium  on foreign  *xchange  is  high--typically  exceeding  a hundred
percent  and  often  in  excess  of three  and  four  hundred  percent°-it  is  argued
here that  these  goals  are  tantamount  to reducing  this  premium.
Essentially,  the  black  market  premium  functions  as a tax  on exports. In
order  to  depreciate  the  real  exchange  rate  and  stimulate  exports,  it  must
be lowered.
In fact,  recent  conditionality  negotiated  between  the  World  Bank
and  IMF  and  many  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  e.g.,  Ghana,  Nigeria,
Sierra  Leone,  Z2mbia,  is interpretable  as  directly  impinging  on the
unification  of official  and  black  market  exchange  rates. The  recent  trend
towards  official  floats  in developing  countries  (Quirk  et  al. (1987))  often
has  as an explicit  goal,  the  absorption  of  black  markets  and  minimizing
black  market  premia  on foreign  exchange. It  has  been  recognized  that  these
goals  must be achieved  by eliminating  distortions  in  economic  incentives,
not  through  unenforceable  legislation  or  costly  surveillance.
The  importance  of the  black  market  lies  in  the  fact  that  the
marginal  cost,  or implicit  resale  value,  of foreign  exchange  is  determined
on this  market. Initial  conditions  include  an official  market  with a
managed  (fixed)  rate,  which  is rationed,  and  a  black  market,  where  thecurrency  floats  freely  and  foreign  exchange  is at  a premium. In contrast
to the  usual  description  of such  dual  markets,  e.g.,  Lizondo  (1984),
Dornbusch  (1986),  domestic  currency  in the  dual  regimes  of  Africa  is  not
convertible  for  either  commercial  (trade)  or capital  (financial)
transactions  at the  official  exchange  rate. As a result,  the  black  market
rate  applies  explicitly  or implicitly  to  both  sets  of transactions.
"Unification"  in  this  paper  will refer  to the  process  whereby  the
black  market  prenium  is lowered  and  the  official  and  black  market  rates
brought  close  to each  other. Complete  elimination  of the  premium  on an on-
going  basis  will require  the  removal  of all  restrictions  on capital  and
commercial  transacticns.  In  practice,  except  for  the  Gambia,  African
countries  that  have  floated  their  currencies  have  done  so only
commercial  transactions  with  capital  controls  retained  for  outwa&A  flows,
e.g.,  Nigeria,  Zaire. For  the  purposes  of this  paper,  this  response  will
count  as  unification.  Whether  or not  capital  controls,  which  are  a
distortion  in intertemporal  trade,  should  be relaxed  depends  on issues
beyond  the  scope  of this  paper,  e.g,,  the  speed  and  extent  of  domestic
financial  liberalization,  and  other  sequencing  issues  (Edwards  and  van
Wijnbergen  (1983)).  When currencies  have  been  floated  on the  trade  account
with capital  controls  retained,  arbitage  possibilities  have  kept subsequent
premia  small,  10-15  percent,  especially  when compared  with their
substantial  initial  levels.  1/
While  there  are  compelling  equity  and  efficiency  arguments  in
favor  of unifying  official  and  black  market  exchange  rates,  there  is  a
second  issue. Unification  could  have important  fiscal  implications,  the
direction  of  which  depends  upon  whether  the  government  on balance  sells
(e.g.,  Nigeria)  foreign  exchange  to,  or buys (e.g.,  Ghana,  Sierra  Leone)- 3 -
foreign  exchange  from  the  private  sector. In the  net  seller  case
(Nigeria),  unification  would  imply  a reversal  of real  income  transfers  back
to  government  from  the  private  sector. In the  net  buyer  case,  unification
could  imply  a substantial  loss  of revenues  from  exports. The  magnitude  of
the  fiscal  effect  in  either  case  depends  upon  the  prevailing  level  of the
premium. Since  Nigeria  is  in a  small  minority,  this  paper  will concentrate
on the  more  common  net  buyer  case,  noting  exceptions  to results  when
appropriate.
in two  recent  instances,  Sierra  Leone  and  Zambia,  there  was a big
surge  in inflation  upon  attempted  unification  of  official  and  black  market
rates  by adopting  market-determined  official  rates. Such  surges  in
inflation  have  high social  and  political  costs,  and  could  create  policy
reversals,  thereby  damaging  the  credibility  not  only  of the  reform,  but
also  of loan  conditionality.  This  paper  explains  such  surges  in  post-
unification  inflation  by the fiscal  effects  of  unification.
Essentially,  there  are  strong  links  between  exchange  rate  and
fiscal  reform. While  the  allocative  goal  of stimulating  exports  requires
that  the  black  market  premitum  be lowered,  this  is in  conflict  with a
revenue  goal.  Given  the  limited  menu  of available  tax  instruments,  the
black  market  premium  is  an important  implicit  tax,  so  that  there  is  a
trade-off  between  the  premium  (tax  on exports)  and  inflation  (tax  on
domestic  money)  in financing  the  fiscal  deficit. Therefore,  unifying
official  and  black  market  exchange  rate  could  raise  inflation  substantially
even  if the  level  of real  government  spending  stays  constant,  as the  lost
revenues  from  exports  are  replaced  with  a higher  tax  on money. To the
extent  that  government  spending  can  be justifiably  reduced  and  other  taxes
justifiably  raised,  this  conflict  is  naturally  lessened. Otherwise,  the
increase  in  post-unification  inflation  will  be permanent.- 4 -
A crucial  step  in  understanding  the  trade-off  between  the  premium
and  inflation  involves  identifying  the  determinants  of the  premium,  which
is  endogenous.  These  determinants  include  fiscal,  monetary  and  exchange
rate  policy,  asset  preferences  and  the  terms  of trade. Accordingly,  the
paper  first  develops  the  links  among  black  market  premia,  real  exchange
rates,  unification  and  inflation. It presents  some  recent  country
experiences  on  unification,  using  this  as a basis  for  proposing  transition
guidelines  and  a changed  emphasis  in loan  conditionality.
II.  REAL EXCHANGE  RATES, INFLATION  AND  THE BLACK  MARKET  PREMIUM
There  are  three  new  resultss  first,  in  order  to  depreciate  the
real  exchange  rate  and  stimulate  exports,  the  black  market  premium  must  be
reduced;  second,  there  is  a  trade-off  between  the  premium  and  inflation  in
financing  the  fiscal  deficit;  and  third,  unification  of  official  and  black
market  exchange  rates  without  a  matching  fiscal  response  will raise
inflation  even  if real  government  spending  remains  unchanged. The  higher
the  premium  to start  with,  the  bigger  will  be the  surge  in the  rate  of
inflation  upon  unification.  2/
An important  idea  is  that  the  marginal,  or implicit,  or
opportunity  cost  of foreign  exchaxLge  is the  freely  floating  black  market
rate. This rate  is at a  premium  relative  to  the  arbitrarily-set  official
rate,  at  which  there  is excess  demand  for  foreign  exchange. Rather  than
deplete  its  scarce  foreign  exchange  reserves  in  order  to "defend"  the
fixed,  official  rate,  the  government  chooses  to ration  t..e  official  market
through  capital  controls,  import  licenses  and  other  means,  thereby
excluding  capital  transactions  and  a large  fraction  of bonafide  commercialtransactions.  The  black  market  rate  therefore  adjusts  to  equilibrate
demand  and  supply  in  the foreign  exchange  market  as a  wholes  foreign
Pxchange  allocated  at the  official  rate  is implicitly  or actually  re-sold.
The  basic  structure  of the  economy  and  assumptions  are  now
outlined. There  is  currency  sub. I  ition  (Calvo  and  Rodriguez  (1977))  with
domestic  residents  holding  two  non  nterest  bearing  assets,  domestic  money
(generically  called  "pesos")  and  foreign  money ('dollars").  Since  there  is
an asset  demend  for  dollars,  the  portfolio  balance  approach  to exchange
rates  is relevant,  implying  that  the  stocks  of  pesos  and  dollars  matter  for
exchange  rates,  not  just  current  account  flows. The  dynamics  of the  stock
of pesos  is influenced  by the  money-financing  of the  fiscal  deficit,  and  of
dollars,  by the  current  account.
The  official  exchange  rate,  e (pesos  per dollar)  serves
effectively  as a tax  on exporters. For simplicity,  the  government  spends
only  on imported  goods  and interest  payments  on  historically  contracted
foreign  debt.  It buys  foreign  exchange  from  the  private  sector  at the
arbitrary  rate,  e.  The  existence  of  a fiscal  deficit  then  allows  a
simultaneous  examination  of the  inflation  tax  on  pesos  (defined  below)  and
the  tax  on exports  by a  choice  of e.
The  official  foreign  exchange  market  is rationed  by capital
controls  and  restrictions  on commercial  transactions.  We assume  that  this
is  done in  such  a  way that  there  is  no official  net foreign  asset
accumulation.  31  Thus,  a fraction  of  private  sector  exports  is surrendered
to the  government  at rate  e.  The  government  uses  this  to partly  finance
its  own spending,  returning  the  balance  to  the  private  sector  (through
import  licenses  and  administrative  allocation)  also  at rate  e.  The
government  chooses  an official  rate  of  depreciation,  Ae/e2o.-6-
The  rationing  scheme  is thus  a redistribution  within  the  private
sector  coupled  with  a net  tax  transfer  to the  government.  Owing  to
rationing,  there  is  a premium  on dollars  in the  black  market,  where  the
exchange  rate  is  b2e.  Domestic  cureencv  is freely  convertible  in the
floating  black  market  at rate  b, the  marginal  cost  of foreign  exchange.
Real  Exchange  Rate 4/
There  is  no capital  in  our  simplified  economy,  and labor  is fully
employed. Two  goods  are  produced:  an  export  good,  X, with  dollar  price  px,
and  a home  good,  H,  with peso  price  PH.  Exports  are  produced  using  labor
(L)  only,  with a simple  constant-returns-to-scale  (CRS)  technology,  X-L.
On the  other  hand,  home goods  are  produced  using  labor  and  intermediate
imports  (oil)  also  with  a CRS  Cobb-Douglas  technology.  Home  goods  include
all  goods  and  economic  activity  that  do  not  contribute  to the  supply  of
tradables. This  would,  in the  African  context,  include  commerce,  e.g.,  the
distribution  and  market5ag  of imported  consumer  goods,  and  highly  protected
manufacturing  that  thrives  on cheap  imports  via  licenses  at the  official
rate (see  also  Krueger  (1974)).
Exports  are  either  surrendered  at rate  e or smuggled  out  at rate
b,  with increasing  marginal  costs  of smuggling. Exports  are  divided
between  the  official  and  black  markets  in such  a  way that  marginal  returns
are  equal  in  both  markets,  i.e.,  bpx-MCS-epx,  where  MCS is  the  marginal
cost  of smuggling  that  increases  with the  volume  of smuggled  exports.
Owing  to the  production  technology,  it follows  that  in  equilibrium,  epx-w,
where  w is the  peso  wage.
Imports  are  priced  at their  marginal  cost,  b (the  dollar  price  of
imports  is  unity). Owing  to the  Cobb-Douglas  technology,  H-LaIl-a,  a
between  0  and  1,  where  I is imports,  so that  in equilibrium,  pH-k.wablBa,-7-
where  k  is  a constant  depending  upon  Q.  Since  w-epx,  the  real  exchange
rate  RER,  or the relative  price  of exports,  ist
(1)  RER  - ep./k(ep,)&  bl-0  - k l(pxj#)1,
where  P  (b/e)  is the  black  market  premium  (actually,  the  premium  plus 1).
A rise  in  RER (real  depreciation)  will increase  the  incentives  to  produce
exports. It is obvious  from  eq. (1)  that,  cet.  par.,  this  will  happen  if
and  only if  the  premium,  0,  falls. Fig.  1 summarizes  this  graphically,  PPF
denoting  the  production  possibilities  between  H and  X.  The  shape  of the
production  possibility  curve  is derived  in  Appendix  1.
Fig.  2 shows  how  total  exports,  XOPt,  at  premium  #, are
distributed  between  the  black  market  (OY)  and  official  market  (YXOPt).
PROPOSITION  lt  In order  to depreciate  RER  and  stimulate  exports,  the  black
market  premium  on foreign  exchange  must be reduced.
Iv.elation  Tax  and  Exports  Tax 5/
Let  H denotc  the  stock  of pesos  and  F  of dollars  held in  private
portfolios.  Given  earlier  assumptions,  g denotes  government  spending  on
imports  and  interest  payments  on foreign  debt  and  is fixed  in  dollars.
Taxes,  t, are  also fixed  in dollars. The  peso  deficit,  e.(g-t),  is
financed  by  printing  pesos. Since  there  is  no net  official  accumulation  of
dollars,  it follows  that  the  change  in the  stock  of pesos,  AM, is  given  by:
(2)  AM  - e.(g-t),
with the  dollar  deficit  converted  into  pesos  at the  official  exchange  rate.
Thus,  AM is  endo,enous  through  the  budget  and  is  also  influenced  by
official  exchange  rate  policy. Eq.(2)  can  be rewritten:  AM/e  - (g-t),  or
(AM/M).(HIe)  - (g-t). The  proceeds  from  the  inflation  tax,  or seignorage,-8-
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Fig. 2  -Smuggling of Exports(g-t),  is the  product  of two  numbers,  (AH/H),  or the  growth  rate  of  money,
and (H/e)Bm,  vhich  we loosely  call  the  real  money  stock. By  analogy  with
other  taxes,  therefore,  the  revenue  from  the  inflation  tax  is given  by the
tax  rate,  (AH/K),  times  the  base  of the  tax,  m.
A property  of such  models  is  that  in steady  state,  AH/H-Ae/e,  so
that  the  rate  of the  inflation  tax  in steady  state  is the  same  as the  rate
of depreciation  of e,  which is  also  the  rate  of inflation.  Hence,
seignorage  in steady  state  is  given  by m(Ae/e)-(g-t).  However,  the
relevant  capital  loss  incurred  by the  private  sector  as  a result  of the
inflation  tax  is (H/b).Ae/e  in steady  state,  since  b, and  not  e, is  the
marginal  cost  of foreign  exchange. Likewise,  the  relevant  burden  from
conventional  taxes  is  et/b. Since  the  private  sector's  loss  is  the
government's  gain,  it follows  that  the  residue  in steady  state  must  be the
implicit  tax  on imports  via  #:
(3)  g  m .Ae + t ,  Ae  +  et  + g(be).
The  tax  on exports  is the  last  term  on the  R.H.S.  of (3),  g((b-e)/b),  which
can  also  be  written  g(l-l/#)  since  #-b/e. Thus,  if  #>2,  i.e.,  the  black
market  premium  exceeds  100  percent,  not  uncommon  in  Africa,  this  tax
finances  upwards  of 50  percent  of government  spending  on imports  and
foreign  interest  paymentsl
Trade-off  Between  Inflation  and  Premium
A portfolio  balance  equation  is  needed  to complete  the  system.
Above,  the  dynamics  of  H were  discussed. The  dynamics  of F are  determined
by the  current  account:
(4)  A? - pxX - g - I,- 10  -
since  net official  dollar  accumulation  is zero.  6/  Private  sector  wealth
is  given  by  WE(M+bF),  where  F is  converted  to  pesos  at the  black  market
rate,  b.  The  share  of  M and  F in  W are  determined  by pertfolio  balance
considerations.  Let  X  be the  fraction  of  W held  as pesos,  M, i.e.,  M-4W.
X depends  upon  the  differential  rate  of return  between  M and  F.  Since
there  are  no interest  rates  in this  model,  this  is  just  the  black  market
rate  of depreciation,  Ab/b. As Ab/b rises,  X  falls,  i.e.  dollars  become
more attractive.  Since  0Eb/e,  it  follows  that  Ab/b-A#/#+Ae/e.  Further,  in
steady  state,  with a given  premium,  Ab/b-he/e.
The  dynamic  equations  of the  system  are (2),  (4)  and  the  portfolio
balance  equation,  which  is an implicit  equation  in  a#/#.  Solving  the
system  for (m,F,#),  it  can  be shown  that  the  determinants  of the  steady
state  premium  #* are  as follows  (see  Pinto  (1987b)):
(5)  - +( g,  t,  px,  Ae/e),
(+)  (-)  (-)  (?)
where  the  signs  of the  comparative  static  expressions  are  shown  below  each
determinant.  A rise  in  g, or fall  in t,  will increase  the  reliance  on the
inflation  tax. For  a  given  rate  of steady  state  inflation,  Ae/e,  this  will
increase  the  steady  state  level  of  m, thereby  requiring  a rise  in the
premium,  #, to restore  portfolio  balance. Likewise,  a rise  in Px (terms  of
trade  improvement)  will,  cet.  par.,  ease  the  supply  of  dollars,  lowering
the  premium  on foreign  exchange.
If the  rate  of deprec  'tion Qe/e  is  changed,  however,  the  effect
on the  premium  is  ambiguous. The intuition  is  as followst  First,  recall
that  steady  state  seignorage  is  m. he/e,  which  can  be  written  (A.Le/e).W/e,
since,  m- X.W/e. Thus,  the  proceeds  from  the  inflation  tax  depend  upon  the
share  of pesos  in financial  wealta,  X, the  rate  of inflation,  Ae/e,  and- 11  -
financial  wealth. We shall  refer  to (N.AeIe)  as the  unit  inflation  tax.
Now suppose  Ae/e  is raised. This  will raise  the  differential  rate  of
return  between  pesos  and  dollars,  making  dollars  more  attractive. This  by
itself  would raise  the  premium. At the  same  time,  however,  since  the  real
deficit,  (g-t),  is given,  a smaller  peso  base is  required  for  the  inflation
tax,  creating  the  ambiguity. It  turns  out  that  whether  or  not t  rises
depends  upon the  inflation  elasticity  of the  share  of  domestic  money  in
wealth,  X.  If this  is  less  than  unity,  raising  he/e  will raise  the  unit
inflation  tax  and  lower  the  premium. Otherwise,  the  premium  will  actually
rise. Thus,  an  acceleration  of the  official  rate  of depreciation  is  not
guaranteed  to lower  the  premium. The  outcome  depends  crucially  on the
inflation  elasticity  of the  demand  for  pesos.
The  inflation  elasticity  of the  demand  for  pesos  rises  with  the
rate  of inflation,  i.e.,  the  propensity  to shift  into  dollars  to  avoid  the
inflation  tax  becomes  stronger  as inflation  rises. This  results  in  a
seignorage  Laffer  curve,  with the  unit inflation  tax  rising  for  inflation
rates  below  the  seignorage-maximizing  level  of inflation  and  falling  above
it.  The  very  same  reasoning  in  conjunction  with the  previous  paragraph
yields  a  u-shaped  curve  linking  the  steady  state  premium  and inflation.
This  is shown  in  Fig.  3.
In  Fig.  3, the  steady-state  premium  is  plotted  on the  Y-axis,  and
the  rate  of inflation,  which  is  also  the  chosen  rate  of official
depreciation,  &e/e,  on the  X-axis. The  two  u-shaped  curves,  BB and  CC
graph  the  relationship  between  the  premium  and inflation  tax  for  two
different  levels  of government  spending,  g1>g 0. For  inflation  rates
between  0 and  A on the  X-axis,  the  inflation  elasticity  of peso  demand
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raises  the  unit inflation  tax  and  lawers  the  steady-state  premium,  #*.
Thus,  to the  left  of A, a rise  in the  tax  on  money  for  given  g, t  and  Px
enables  a lower  tax  on exports,  embodying  a trade-off  between  the  two
taxes. To the  right  of  A, exactly  the  opposite  is  true:  a rise  in  Ae/e
will raise  #*  because >1.  A trade-off  is  not  possible. OA is  the
seignorage-maximizing  rate  of inflation  (v-1).
Now  suppose  real  government  spending  is raised  from  go to g1. The
curve  shifts  upwards  from  the  solid  line,  BB,  to the  dotted  line,  CC: for
any  chosen  Ae/e,  a  higher  tax  on exports  is  required  to finance  the  higher
deficit. Assume  that  g-g, 0 so  that  BB ia  the  relevant  curve. Omax(go)  is
defined  as the  maximum  level  of the  premium  that  will enable  the  government
to  meet its  dollar  requirements  from  surrendered  exports,  since  from  Figs.
1  and  2, it is  obvious  that  these  will fall  as the  premium  rises.
Likewise,  there  is  a  minimum  level  of the  premium,  #min,  compatible  with
the  above  system. In the  dual  regime,  owing  to rationing,  it is  desirable
that  #*  exceed  one. We also  assume  that  it is  possible  for  the  government
to finance  the  entire  deficit  by inflation,  should  it  choose  to.  This
implies  the  elimination  of the  tax  on imports  or #*-l.  Thus,  #min-l  and
the  relevant  range  of inflation  rates  for  a tradeoff  with g-go  is (D,
1(g 0)) as shown  in  Fig. 3. 7/
A terms  of trade  improvement  (rise  in  Px)  affects  AF favorably,
hence  lowers  #*:  for  given  g, t and  Ae/e,  a rise  in  Px lowers  the  u-shaped
curves  in  Fig.  3, raising  #max  and  lowering  il.  A fall  in  Px  has  exactly
the  opposite  effects.
PROPOSITION  2:  Assume  that,  for  given  g,  t and  Px' the  rate  of inflation
in the  dual regime  is  chosen  to lie  in  the interval  (D, 1(g 0)) with  g-g 0.
In other  words,  there  is a trade-off  between  Ae/e  and  #  to start  with,  and- 14 -
1<1 (a  necessary  condition  for  the  trade-off).  Then,  if the  peco  is
floated  overnight  (official  rationing  is  eliminated  and  the  rate  of
depreciation  endogenized,  or determined  by market  forces)  post-unification
inflation  will rise  permanently.
In fact,  the  rate  of inflation  that  will emerge  is  1(g 0).  If g
were  equal  to  the  higher  level,  g1 corresponding  to CC in  Fig.  3, the
higher  rate 1(g 1) would  be the  post-unification  inflation  level. The
proof  of  PROPOSITION  2 is obvious  from  Fig.  3.
Fi,. 4 illustrates  the  two  possible  inflation  equilibria  upon
floating  the  currency. The  inverted  u-shaped  curve  is the  unit inflation
tax.  The  horizontal  line  DD indicates  the  level  of required  unit  inflation
tax  for  given  fiscal  policy  and  terms  of trade. rl(go)  and  1rh(go)  shown  in
Fig.  4  correspond  exactly  to those  in Fig.  3, as does  the  point  A.  For
g-g 1, D'D'  applies.  8/
We have so  far  considered  the  case  where  the  government  is  a  net
buyer  of foreign  exchange  from  the  private  sector. What about  countries
such  as  Nigeria,  where  the  opposite  holds?  In the  dual  regime,  a premium  on
dollars  implies  a real  income  transfer  from  the  government  to the  private
sector. Thus,  overnight  floating  that  unifies  official  and  black  market
rates  will  eliminate  this  transfer,  improving  the  budgetary  situation.
Therefore,  the  horizontal  line  DD  will  move  downwards  upon  unification,
actually  lowering  rl(go)  and  lowering  post-unification  inflation.
A final  comment  in this  section:  the  determinants  of the  steady-
state  premium  (see  eq. (5))  in the  dual  regime  do  not include  the  level  of
the  official  exchange  rate,  e, but  only  its  rate  of depreciation,  Ae/e.
This  implies  that  discrete,  one-shot  devaluations,  say  every  6  months,  will
reduce  the  premium  only  temporarily.  As  we shall  see  in the  next  section,- 15 -
there  is  much empirical  corroboration  for  this  established  result
(Dornbusch  et al. (1983),  Lizonido  (1984),  Pinto  (1986)). Such  devaluations
will reduce  the  premium  permanently  only  in  the  uninteresting  case  where
the  real  deficit  is  zero. Otherwise,,  the  effects  will  be strictly
temporary  in  the  absence  of  more fundamental  changes  in fiscal  and  monetary
policy,  since  devaluations  do  not affect  growth  rates. However,
devaluations  are  valuable  in speeding  up adjustment  when  they  accompany
reductions  in  the  real  deficit,  and  as a signal  of intent  to introduce  more
basic  riforms.
Ill. COUNTRY  EXPERIENCES  WITH  UNIFICATION  9/
Ghana
Between  1975  and  1983,  the  Ghanaian  economy  exhibited  the
following  features:  large  fiscal  deficits  financed  by  printing  money;
strict  foreign  exchange  rationing,  with the  black  market  rate  applying
implicitly  to all  foreign  exchange  transactions;  asset  demand  for  dollars
as a  hedge  against  inflation;  inflation  and  the  price  level  strongly
correlated  with  movements  in the  black  market  rate;  and  the  black  market
premium  serving  purely  as a tax-subsidy  scheme.
The  black  market  premium  was generally  in  excess  of 500  percent,
attaining  a record  level  of over  2000  percent  in 1982. Average  inflation
exceeded  50 percent  per  year,  with triple-digit  levels  in 1977,  1981  and
1983. Reported  real  per  capita  income  fell  by 30  percent  between  1970  and
1982,  and  production,  including  the  key  exports,  cocoa  and  gold,  fell
sharply. Rather  than  correct  fiscal  or exchange  rate  policy,  external
balance  was forced  by rationing  the  official  foreign  exchange  market  so- 16 -
that  the  official  current  account  was small  relative  to  other  African
countries,  never  exceeding  1.5  percent  of GDP (see  Pinto  and  van  Wijnbergen
(1987)).
In  April  1983,  Ghana  adopted  an IHF  - supported  Economic  Recovery
Program  (ERP). The  ERP initiated  fiscal  and  exchange  rate  reform,  with
huge  export  premia  and  import  surcharges  causing  a  de facto  devaluation  of
roughly  800  percent  of the  Ghanaian  cedi (¢).  This  was followed  in  October
1983  by an actual  devaluation  of 990  percent  - a record  perhaps,  for  the
biggest  one-shot  deval"ation  - with the  exchange  rate  being  adjusted  from
2.75  ¢/S  tr  30 ¢/$. The system  of  premia  and  surcharges  was simultaneously
scrapped. Lhe black  market  rate  at the  time  was roughly  90¢/$.
Subsequent  measures  included  an export  retention  scheme:  non-cocoa
exporters  could  keep some  fraction  of their  earnings  for  debt  service  and
approved  imports. More significant  was the  re-introduction  and
formalization  in October,  1985,  of the  special  import  license  scheme  - the
SIL  market  - whereby  licenses  would  be freely  issued  to those  who  wished  to
bring  imports  in through  the  black  market,  provided  they  paid the  requisite
taxes. The  creation  of the  SIL  market  conferred  recognition  on the  black
market  as a channel  for  trade  flows  and  source  of dollars,  being  an
important  step  in unification.
Through  a series  of discrete  devaluations,  the  official  exchange
rate  had  by September,  1986  reached  a level  of 90  I/$,  but  was still  at a
substantial  discount  relative  to the  SIL  and  black  markets,  necessitating
rationing. It  was therefore  decided  to split  the  official  market  into  two
tierss  a fixed  rate  tier,  with an officially  set  rate,  and  an  auction  for
raw  materials  and  inputs  oally.  The  resultant  segmentation  of transactions- 17 -
represented  the  continued  taxation  of cocoa  and subsidization  of petroleum,
since  domestic  prices  in  both  cases  were to  be set  at the  fixed  tier  rate.
The  fixed  rate  and  auction  markets  were unified  at the  auction
rate  in  March,  1987.  The  next step  is  the  merging  of the  auction  and  SIL
markets,  by gradually  permitting  consumer  goods  into  the  auction. Capital
controls  have  been  retained.
Assessment  of the  Ghanaian  Response
Ghana's  strategy  has  been  one  of gradual  reduction  of fiscal
deficits  combined  with  widely-spaced,  but  large  devaluations  of its
currency,  the  cedi. At the  same  time,  it  has  sought  to re-establish  its
international  credit  rating  and  launched  a tax  and  tariff  restructuring
program. The  measures  after  September,  1986,  may  be described  as the
gradual  removal  of foreign  exchange  rationing  coupled  with the  unification
of the  official,  auction  and  SIL  markets  at a free  market  rate.
Instead  of its  chosen  path  of discrete  maxi-devaluations
accompanying  fiscal  reform,  Ghana  could  have  initially  accelerate6  the  rate
of  depreciation  of the  cedi  above  prevailing  rates  of inflation  in order  to
depreciate  the  official  real  exchange  rate.10/  This  response  could  have
been  destabilizing.  Such  acceleration  could  also  have  been  motivated  by a
desire  to respond  to the  considerable  black  market  premium. Available
estimates  (Pinto  (1986))  suggest  that  when the  ERP  was launched,  prevailing
rates  of inflation  in  Ghana  exceeded  the  seignorage-maximizing  rate  of
inflation,  implying  that  the  inflation  elasticity  of the  demand  for  cedi
balances  exceeded  one. An acceleration  therefore,  could  have  backfired,
raising  the  premium  (recall  Fig.  3).- 18  _
The  experience  of Bolivia  (Sachs  (1987),  Kharas  and  Pinto  (1987))
suggests  that  this  is  no theoretical  curiosity. In the  three  years
preceding  1983,  the  rates  of inflation  in  Bolivia  were 47,  32,  and  124
percent,  respectively,  not  unlike  those  in  Ghana. In 1983,  the  Bolivian
inflation  rate  was 276  percent. The  black  market  premium,  however,  was
much  lower  than  in  Ghana. In the  last  quarter  of 1984,  with the  average
premium  having  more  than  doubled  since  1980-81,  there  was considerable
pressure  to  unify  exchange  rates,  although  the  premium  at 2.95  was low  by
Ghanaian  standards. It  was decided  to  use  nominal  exchange  rate  policy  to
minimize  the  black  market  premium. The  erroneous  argument  that  the
equilibrium  nominal  exchange  rate  was  a  weighted  average  of the  official
and  black  rates,  and  that  the  official  rate  be devalued  towards  it,
resulted  in  a rule  that  directly  linked  official  depreciation  to the  black
market  premium. Official  depreciation  jumped  to 350  percent  in  the  last
quarter  of 1984,  and  455  percent  in  the  first  quarter  of 1985. The  premium
fell  at first,  but  with the  black  market  rate  responding,  it rose  again,
resulting  eventually  in 496  percent  inflation  in the  first  quarter  of 1985,
an annualized  rate  of 126,000  percentl
The  Bolivian  hyperinflation  illustrates  that  targeting  the  premium
through  exchange  rate  policy  alone  could  be costly. It also  suggests  that
there  is a sequencing  issue  in the  introduction  of fiscal  and  exchange  rate
reform,  with fiscal  reform  coming  first. An important  reason  is that
fiscal  reform  takes  longer  and  is  more  difficult  to implement,  so that  it
takes  time  to  become  credible. On the  other  had,  a change  in exchange  rate
policy  can  literally  be undertaken  overnight,  via  a central  bank  bulletin.
Given  the  initial  conditions  in  Ghana,  the  measures  taken  soon
after  launching  the  ERP  are  defensible,  assuming  that  there  were both
economic  and  political  objections  to getting  rid  of import  licensing  and- 19  -
floating  the  cedi immediately.  Economic  objections  would  have  pertained  to
the  fiscal  problem,  the  lack  of  documented  experience  with floats  in
developing  countries,  the  policy  credibility  problem  and  the  suitability  of
institutional  mechanisms,  in  view  of.the  problems  with the  banking  sector.
Political  objections  would  have  centered  around  a reluctance  to get  rid  of
administrative  allocation,  which  is  commonly  perceived  in  developing
countries  as a  way of  ensuring  an optimal  allocation  of foreign  exchange.
Once  the  SIL  market  was created,  however,  the  gradualism  with
which  exchange  reform  has  been  proceeding  must defer  to  political,  instead
of economic  arguments. There  are  no economic  reasons  for  not  having
removed  all  restrictions  immediately  on  commercial  transactions  thereby
merging  the  fixed  rate,  auction  and  SIL  markets. If there  is  a desire  to
restrict  the  importation  of  certain  goods,  this  could  be better  achieved
through  an appropriate  tax  system. Lastly,  there  is the  question  of  what
permanent  arrangement  will  be adopted  after  the  three  markets  are  unified.
The  current  proposal  is to  continue  with the  auction  system. The  role  of
coummercial  banks  and  the  possibility  of an interbank  float  need  to be
considered  as a serious  alternative  (see  Pinto  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1987)
for  a discussion  of this  issue).
Nigeria 11/
By 1981,  oil  had  become  the  key determinant  of  Nigeria's  real
income,  external  terms  of trade,  creditworthiness,  government  revenues  and
foreign  exchange  earnings. The  oil  sector  had  come  to account  for  22
percent  of GDP,  81 percent  of government  revenues  and  96  percent  of
exports.  12/- 20 -
The  black  market  premium  was fairly  steady  uxntil  the  oil  glut  in
1982,  when three  things  happeneds first,  the  price  of oil  fell  far  below
expectations:  second,  government  spending  remained  roughly  the  same  so that
the  reliance  on the  inflation  tax  fdr  financing  the  fiscal  deficil
increased  considerably  (see  Table  1);  third,  foreign  exchange  rationing  was
intensified  to deal  with  excess  demand  for  dollars  at the  official  rate.
The  black  market  premium  - defined  as the  ratio  of the  black  market  to the
official  exchange  rate  - continued  growing,  implying  in  particular  that  the
Nigerian  naira  was depreciating  faster  on the  black  market. After  1984.3,
it stabilized.  These  developments  coincided  with the  declining  real  price
of oil,  as can  be seen  from  Table  1.
Reductions  in real  government  spending  and  official  imports  are
efficacious  in reducing  the  premium,  as seen  in  Section  II.  In substantial
measure,  fiscal  austerity  since  the  end  of 1984  exploited  this  possibility.
The  deficit/GDP  ratio  and  the  growth  rate  of  nominal  money  fell  sharply  as
a result. The  exchange  rate  regime,  however,  remained  the  same  with the
exception  of  a faster  rate  of depreciation,  as is  evident  from  Table  1.  13/
The  fiscal  burden  of rents  was substantials  given  an illustrative
import  program  of  U.S. $  3 billion  and  a black  market  premium  anywhere
between  2 Nl$  and  3  N/S  during  the  import  licensing  era, rents  were  between
N6 and  N9 billion,  a significant  fraction  of annual  GDP  at roughly  N70
billion  (N  denoting  lnaira"). In addition  to the  inequity  inherent  in this
unearned  income  transfer,  the  import  licensing  system  was also  inefficient:
it  enabled  economic  activity  unviable  with a  more realistic  exchange  rate,
encouraged  businessmen  to invest  resources  in  the  pursuit  of rents  and
placed  an enormous  administrative  burden  on civil  servants.  14/- 21 -
Table  lt  NIGERIA-DEFICIT  FINANCE,  INFLATION,  AND PREMIUM
(Quarterly  Averages)
Oil Boom  oil  Gluta/
1980.1-1981.3  1981.4-1984.3  1984.4-1985.4
1.  Real  price  of oil  116.04  94.57  80.07
2. (a)  Change  in  net  claims  on
govt./beginning
monetary  base (X)  2.48  11.59  1.18
(b)  Growth  rate  of  monetary
base (2)  4.55  5.83  3.00
3.  Inflation  - CPI (Z)  4.49  5.78  -0.84
4.  Depreciation
(a) Official  2.36  1.16  4.06
(b) black  market  -0.36  12.00  2.18
5.  Black  market  premium  1.61  2.66  4.24
a/  The  second  sub-period,  1984.4  to 1985.4,  refers  to the  period  of
fiscal  austerity.
Sources  and  Notes:
1.  Real  Price  of Oils Nigerian  bonny  light  petroleum  prices  deflated
by  U.S.  WPI (1980.1  - 100)  oil  pricess  EPD,  IBRD;  U.S.  WPI:
IFS,  IMF.
2.  Net  claims  on  Government:  line  32an,  IFS;  Monetary  Base:  Reserve
Money  +  Net  Claims  on  Government  by commercial  banks  (lines  14
+  22a-26d),  IFS,  IMP.
3.  CPI,  official  exchange  rate (period  averages)t IFS,  IMF.
4.  Premium  - black  market  rate/official  rate.  Black  market  rates  from
World  Currency  Yearbook.- 22 -
Another  compelling  reason  to unify  was the  budgets  moving  to  a
market  exchange  rate  would  substantially  increase  the  naira  revenues  from  the
sale  of oil  dollars  to the  private  sector. On September  26,  1986,  Nigeria
held its  first  foreign  exchange  auction  as a prelude  to  establishing  a
floating  interbank  market,  simultaneously  abolishing  the  import  license
system,  a step  of immense  symbolic  and  real  value.
Subsequent  movements  in prices  and  exchange  rates  in  Nigeria  have
laid  to rest  two  common  misconceptions  regarding  dual  regimes  of the  type
discussed  in  this  paper. The  first  is the  idea  that  in dual  regimes,  the
"equilibrium"  exchange  rate  is some  average  of the  official  and  black  market
rates,  with the  weights  equal  to the  export--or  import--  shares  of these
markets. By this  argument,  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  should  have  been
close  to 1.5  naira  to the  dollar,  since  95  percent  of Nigerian  exports  are
oil,  whose  receipts  went through  the  official  channel. In  practice,  an
exchange  rate  emerged  that  was  close  to the  one  in the  black  market,  where
the  rate  was  between  4 and  5  naira  to the  dollar,  and  which  was invariably
dismissed  as "thin". Analytically,  this  is  not surprising  owing  to resale-
-there  was a  virtual  secondary  market  in import  licenses--and  the  fact  that
prices  are  determined  on the  margin.
The  second  misconception  is  that  if  unification  involves  a
substantial  one-shot  depreciation  of the  official  rate,  the  effects  will be
inflationary.  This  in itself  will  not  be inflationary,  since  the  more
depreciated  black  market  rate  is  already  reflected  in  domestic  prices. Post-
nification  inflation  depends  rather  on the  fiscal  implications  of  unification
and  subsequent  other  changes  in fiscal  and  monetary  policy.
In conclusion,  one  can  make  a strong  case  for  the  Nigerian  naira
having  been floated  earlier,  especially  in  view  of the  salutary  fiscal
effects. The  delay  must  be attributed  to political  constraints:  the  Nigerian- 23 -
goverDment  had  demonstrated  fiscal  discipline  mince  1984,  with a  proven  track
record  in its  ability  to  control  spending  and  pay  attention  to budget
constraints.  Nevertheless,  once  the  decision  to float  was  made,  the
interbank  float  was introduced  with commendable  professionalism  and  openness.
Above  all,  care  has  been  taken  to  maintain  confidence  in the  domestic  banking
system,  and  in living  up to the  commitment  that  private  capital  reflow.  from
abroad  would  be treated  on a confidential,  "no  questions"  basis. These
measures  will  go a long  way in  establishing  the  interbank  floating  market  as
a  credible  and  effective  exchange  rate  system.
Zaire
Following  a period  of transition,  which  lasted  about  five  months,
Zaire  adopted  a  unified  floating  exchange  rate  regime  in  February,  1984.
During  the  transition,  dual  official  rates  were implemented  as  a prelude  to
unification.  The float  has  been in  existence  for  over  three  years,
representing  the  longest-lived  experience  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  with floating
regimes. Excluding  the  discontinued  auctions  in  Sierra  Leone  and  Uganda,
Zaire  is  also  the  first  Sub-Saharan  African  country  to officially  float  its
currency: we note importantly  that  before  the  transition,  which  began  in
September,  1983,  Zaire  had  the  usual,  implicit  dual regime,  with the  marginal
cost  of foreign  exchange  determined  on a floating,  black  market.
Since  Zaire  is in  a sense  a success  story,  this  case  study  will
describe  how  the  transition  to the  float  was  managed. In contrast  to  other
experiences,  e.g.,  Ghana,  Nigeria,  the  transition  was smooth  and  brief. We
shall  therefore  focus  almosL  exclusively  on this  aspect  of the  Zairian
experience.- 24 -
Initial  Conditions
Table  2 summarizes  key  economio  data  on Zaire  from  1980-85.
Zaire  has  had  a history  of high  inflation  as evidenced  in  Table  2 by the
growth  rate  of base  money,  the  CPT  and  currency  depreciation.  In the  three
years  preceding  the  float  1981-83,  moreover,  the  average  black  market  premium
was roughly  the  same,  implying  that  black  market  depreciation  matched
official  deoreciations  the  dip  in  the  premium  in 1983  is  due  to the  first
phase  of the  float,  which  was introduced  in  September,  1983. This  confirms
the  established  result  that  periodic  devaluations  will  not  reduce  the  black
market  premium  unless  accompanied  by more fundamental  reforms. Thus,  the
fiscal  deficit/GDP  ratio  actually  increased  between  1980-82,  coinciding  with
a  steady  deterioration  in  the  terms  of trade. Both  dev-elopments,  the  first  a
policy  variable  and  the  second  an exogenous  shock,  would  have  exerted  upward
pressure  on the  premium.
In  terms  of exchange  arrangements,  the  currency  of Zaire,  the  zaire,
had  had an  adjustable  peg  against  the  SDR  since  March,  1976. Foreign
exchange  was administratively  allocated  for  trade  and  current  transactions
and  there  were,  and  are,  capital  controls.
Transition.  to  Unified  Float
Following  a devaluation  of 345  percent  against  the  SDR  on September
26,  1986,  Zaire  floated  its  currency,  adopting  dual  official  rates  during  the
transition.  The  fixed-rate  market  was restricted  to  the  official  operations
of the  Bank  of Zaire,  while  the  free  rate  covered  the  rest  of the  banking
system. The  free  rate  was set  initially  at the  prevailing  relance  miniere
rate,  a special  rate  created  to deter  diamond  smuggling  and  equalling  the
black  market  rate.  Subsequently,  during  the  first  phase  which  lasted  till- 25  -
October  14,  1983,  the  free  rate  was set  by commercial  banks  in  consultation
with the  Bank  of Zaire  based  on rates  they  intended  to apply  to transactions
on the  free  market. The  official  rate  was  constrained  to lie  within  a spread
of 10 percent  of the  free  rate. There  were,  consequently,  three  rates  during
the  transition:  the  official  rate,  the  (legal)  free  rate  and  the (illegal)
black  market  rate,  which  persisted  owing  to the  retention  of capital
controls.
In addition  to fulfilling  various  other  conditions,  the  second  phase
of the  transition  had  two  distinctive  features: (a)  explicit  guidelines  were
set  for  determining  the  free  rate  at a  weekly  fixing,  with banks  free  to
diverge  from  this  indicative  rate  both  for  interbank  and  other  transactions
based  on  market  conditions;  and  (b),  the  spread  between  the  official  and
free  rates  was reduced  to 5  percent. The  net  foreign  exchange  holdings  of
commercial  banks  were restricted  by the  end  of the  second  phase  to increase
the  availability  of foreign  exchange  in the  interbank  market. In subsequent
phases,  the  spread  was reduced  to 2.5  percent  and  in  February,  1984,  the  two
rates  were  unified.- 26  -
Table  2:  ZAIRE-BLACK  MARKET  PREMIUM,  DEFICITS AND INFLATION
1980-85
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
Premium
Period  average  2.30  2.38  2.34  2.17  1.00  1.00
end-of-period  2.31  2.47  2.96  1.16  1.03  1.06
Fiscal  Deficit/GDP  (Z)  0.60  3.60  7.10  2.10  2.40  n.a.
Terms  of Trade  Index  100.00  89.10  80.00  78.90  89.70  n.a.
Base  Money  Growth  (X)  106.91  56.61  87.95  50.09  65.24  30.16
Inflation-CPI  (X)  42.07  34.91  36.23  77.13  52.23  23.82
Depreciation  (Z)
Official  62.00  56.60  31.20  124.20  180.30  38.00
Black  Market  25.00  62.10  29.10  107.30  29.40  40.70
Sources  and  Notes: Black  market  exchange  rates  are  from  the  World  Currency
Yearbook. Official  rates,  inflation  and  base  money (lines  14  +  22a-26d)  are
from  IFS,  IMF. All other  data  are staff  estimates  based  on  official  data.
Depreciation  is  defined  as  percentage  changes  in  period  averages.
As a supporting  measure,  there  was an  exchange  and  trade  system
liberalization  timed  to coincide  with the  transition  to the  unified  ,loat.
It included  the  following: the  requirement  that  commercial  banks  give  to
the  Bank  of Zaire  30  percent  of the  export  earnings  surrendered  to them  was
dispensed  with to increase  the  volume  in  the  free  market; resident  foreign
currency  accounts,  used in  the  past  to finance  black  market  activities,  were
abolished.  15/  Export  retention  quotas,  with a few  exceptions,  were also
eliminated;  guidelines  on how  commercial  banks  should  allocate  their  foreign
exchange  were simplified  greatly,  with  only  the  broad  restriction  that  25
percent  be allocated  for  invisibles,  and  the  remaining  75  percent  for  trade;
and  the  system  of imports  financed  from  the  black  market,  as  well as the
relance  miniere  rate,  was  discontinued.- 27 -
The smoothness  of the  transition  may be attributed  to two  main
factorss first,  the  transactions  were  well-segmented,  with  all  private
sector  commercial  activity  taking  place  at the  free  rate. Not  only  would
this  have  minimized  allocative  inefficiency,  but  by avoiding  exceptions,  it
removed  the  basis  for  lobbying  to  have a given  company's  activity  classified
on the  fixed,  rather  than  the  more  depreciated  free,  tier.  Second,  the
fixed  rate  was  merged  with the  free  rate  through  a series  of  discrete
adjustments  rather  than  an accelerated  crawl,  which  analytical  models  would
recommend  as a desirable  course  in  view of Zaire's  history  of  high
inflation. In addition,  fiscal  discipline  was tightened  in  both 1983  and
1984 (see  Table  2),  which  undoubtedly  aided  the  switch  in  the  exchange  rate
regime  by minimizing  inflation,  and  hence,  currency  depreciation.
Sierra  Leone  16/
Sierra  Leone  floated  its  currency,  the  leone,  overnight  in  June,
19R6.  The  value  of 0  was between  3  and  4 just  before  the  float,  implying  a
substantial  tax  on exports  of between  67 and  75  percent.  Inflation  rose
from  an annual  average  of 70  percent  for  the  three  years  before  the  float  to
an annual  rate  of about  200  percent  post-float.
Sierra  Leone's  experience  indicates  that  in achieving  unification,
fiscal  reform  has to  precede  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  regime  if  a switch
from  a dual  to floating  regime  is  planned  with a  high initial  premium. The
reason  is  that  in the  absence  of  matching  and  credible  fiscal  reform,  a
politically  untenable  rate  of inflation  might  emerge. This  could  result  in
the  perpetuation  of sensitive  subsidies,  such  as those  on staple  foods
(rice)  and  petroleum,  which  were partly  financed  by the  premium  (tax  on
exports)  in  the  dual  regime. Thus,  subsidies  which  were implicit  in the- 28 -
dual  regime  become  explicit  post  unification,  actually  worsening  the  real
deficit. In arguing  that  subsidies  be retained,  lobbies  have only  to  point
at the  surge  in inflation. Such  a scenario  actually  unfolded  in Sierra
Leone: privatizing  was available  as a  way of eliminating  subsidies  prior  to
the  float. However,  private  traders,  who  were  willing  to  take  over
importing  and  distributing  rice  before  the  float,  refused  to  touch  it  once
inflation  rose  for  fear  of being  blamed  for  price  hikes.
A review  of  budgetary  developments  reveals  that  fiscal  discipline
was  at its  weakest  when the  currency  was floated  in June,  1986. After
falling  to a low  of 7  percent  of  GDP in 1983/84,  the  fiscal  deficit  peaked
at 14  percent  in 1985/86. Three  main reasons  underlay  this  deterioration  in
fiscal  performance.
First,  there  was  a monotonic  decline  in  the  share  of tax revenue  in
GDP,  which  fell  from  16.5  percent  in  1978/79  to  5.6  percent  in 1985/86.
Second,  the subsidies  on rice  and  petroleum,  which  have  persisted
post-float,  constitute  a  big  drain  on resources. The  rice  subsidy  is
distributed  via the  Produce  Marketing  Board  (SLPMB),  which  effectively  taxes
coffee  and  cocoa  to subsidize  rice,  which  it imports,  thereby  eroding
incentives  to  produce  rice  domestically  as  well.  The  petroleum  subsidy
accounted  for  roughly  half the  difference  between  the  actual  deficit  of 14.5
percent  of GDP  in 1985/86  and  its  budgeted  level  of 3  percent.
Third,  there  is  no revenue  contribution  by Sierra  Fishing,  and
suitable  tax  and  royalty  contracts  with the  mining  companies  do  not  exist.
This is surprising  for  a  country  with  as rich  and  diversified  a  mineral  base
as Sierra  Leone's.
Table  3 summarizes  the  budgetary  situation  and  exchange  rate
movements  since  the  inception  of the  float  (comparative  pre-float  data  are
not  available). The  deficit,  expressed  in  US$  at the  black  market  rate,- 29 -
peaked  in  October  1986  at $5.4  million,  fell  in  November  and  December  and
then  rose  again  in January  1987. The  black  market  rate,  like  the  official
rate,  depreciated  rapidly. Owing  to  artificial  fixing  of the  official  rate-
-there  was  not  even  one  transaction  in  the  interbank  market  between  June,
1986  and  March,  1987--it  remained  at a discount  relative  to the  black
market. For  practical  purposes,  the  black  market  is  the  unified  rate  for
all  transactions,  with  the  market  made  by some  15 diamond  exporters.
Table  3:  SIERRA  LEONE-FISCAL  DEFICITS  MONETARY  BASE  AND  INFLATION
Deficit  Monetary  Base  Real  Monetary Black  Market
($,  millions)  (Leone,  millions)  Base  Exchange  Rate
($,  millions)  (Le/$)
1986
June  n.a.  1423.28  61.88  23.00
July  2.15
August  5.10
September  3.52  1894.99  57.42  33.00
October  5.39
November  4.49
December  3.9 a1/  2122.05  51.13  41.50
1987
January  3.23  2064.70  43.93  47.00
a/  Excludes  a cash  grant  from  Saudi  SAMA  of $5  million.
Sources  and  Notes: Bank  of Sierra  Leone  (B.S.L.)  except  black  market
rates,  which  are  staff  estimates. Conversion  to  U.S.  dollars  is  at black
market  rate. Monetary  Base  is  defined  as currency  outside  banks  +
commercial  banks's  deposits  with  B.S.L.  +  cash-in-hand  of commercial  banks  +
net  claims  on government  by commercial  banks.
The  rapid  depreciation  of the  Sierra  Leonean  leone  shown  in  Table  3
has  been  fuelled  by the  fiscal  deficit. It  has  been financed  by the
inflation  tax  - printing  money  and,  compared  to  prevailing  rates  of- 30 -
inflation,  low  nominal  interest-bearing  treasury  bills.  17/  FroA  Table  3,
the  average  monthly  real  deficit  between  August,  1986  and  January,  1987  was
about  US $4.5  million. The  real  monetary  base  was roughly  $50  million,
implying  that  an inflation  rate  of 9  percent  per  month  was required  to
generate  the  necessary  seignorage  for  the  deficit. For  the  six  months  ended
December,  1986,  this  implies  70  percent  inflation,  which  corresponds  closely
to  actual  inflation,  and  hence,  the  depreciation  of the  leone.
The  real  monetary  base  declined  monotonically  between  June,  1986
and  January,  1987. High inflation  has  created  a disincentive  for  holding
leone  assets  and  provided  a  motive  for  diversifying  into  dollars  to avoid
the  inflation  tax.  The  shift  to bank  accounts  abroad,  or even  to dollar
bills,  has reduced  the  real  monetary  base so that  a  higher  rate  of inflation
- the  tax  rate  - is required  to generate  the  same  real  revenue. The  decline
ir.  the  ratio  of quasi-money  (time  and  savings  deposits)  to  Ml (currency
outside  banks  plus  demand  deposits)  from  0.35  in 1985  to 0.31  in  June,  1986
and  0.23  in  December,  1986,  confirms  this.
There  is little  doubt,  given  the  substantial  initial  level  of the
premium  and  low  policy  credibility,  that  the  Sierra  Leonean  float  was poorly
timed.  While  switching  to  a float  may  have  complicated  the  fiscal  reform
process,  it  has  highlighted  the  urgency  of the  needed  reforms.
Zambia
Zambia's  experience  indicates  that  exchange  rate  reform  without
fiscal  reform  may  be futile. The  tradeoff  is  between  two  sets  of
circumstances,  both  unpalatable.  Not introducing  exchange  rate  reform  and
living  with a dual  regime  is costly  in  terms  of  misallocation  and  policy
credibility.  On the  other  hand,  unifying  at a  market-determined  rate- 31 -
without  fiscal  reform  could  produce  high  inflation  and rapid  currency
depreciation,  which  have  welfare  costs  and  impede  subsequent  fiscal  reform,
as the  Sierra  Leonean  case  study  showed.
Over  the  years,  Zambia  has experimented  with  a variety  of exchange
rate  regimes. In  December,  1971,  it delinked  its  currency,  the  kwacha,  from
the  pound  sterling  to  establish  a peg  to the  U.S.  dollar. This  was followed
in 1976  by a  move to  a "controlled  float"  and  an adjustable  peg  to the  SDR.
In  July,  1983,  the  link  to the  SDR  was  abandoned  in favor  of a crawling  peg:
the  kwacha  was linked  to  a currency  basket  and  depreciated  every  month  at  a
predetermined  rate. Rationing  through  import  licensing,  however,  was
retained. The  depreciation  was substantial  between  1983  and 1985  (see  Table
4  below). This  exchange  rate  rule  was replaced  by a foreign  exchange
auction  in  October,  1985. Interest  rates  were decontrolled  a month  earlier
to  mobilize  savings,  promote  a  more efficient  use  of financial  resources  and
ensure  compatibility  with the  new,  market  exchange  rate  regime.
Three  basic  motives  underlay  the  decision  to start  an auction:
first,  to  adjust  to terms  of trade  shocks  which  had  initially  been  thought
transitory  and responded  to  by running  down  reserves  and  borrowing;  second,
to cope  with external  balance  problemsl  and  third,  to  minimize  adminis-
trative  allocation  by  moving  to  a  market-clearing  exchange  rate. There  was
some  recognition  that  the  exchange  rate  rule  in  vogue  between  1983  and  1985
was  not resulting  in  either  an "equilibrium"  or  unified  exchange  rate  (see
Kaunga  (1985)  and  Pinto  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1987)). The  data  in  Table  4
below  confirm  this. The  terms  of trade  declined  steadily  and  the  black
market  premium  persisted  despite  an increase  in  the  official  rate  of
devaluation  after  1983. The  fiscal  deficit/GDP  ratio  was also  consistently
high,  despite  temporary  reductions  in  1983  and  1984.- 32 -
Assessment  of the  Zambian  Experience
The  adoption  of  market-determined  exchange  rates  is  motivated  by
two  broad  considerations:  an exchange  rate  adjustment  is  needed,  but  the
magnitude  of change  cannot  be easily  determined;  and  the reliance  on rules
does  not  produce  a desired  outcome,  e.g.,  unification.  Once  the  decision  is
made  to let  market  forces  determine  the  exchange  rate,  the  choice  is between
an  auction  and  an interbank  float.
The  main differences  between  the  two  mechanisms  are  the following:
18/  (a)  commercial  banks  have  a larger  role  in interbank  floats,  since  they
hold foreign  exchange  and  re-sell  it to  private  sector  importers  after
buying  it from  the  central  bank.  They  therefore  have some  incentive  to
ensure  it is "fairly'  priced. In auctions,  the  main administrative  burden
is  on the  central  bank,  to  which  all  foreign  exchange  is surrendered.
Further,  there  is  no re-sale. The  commercial  banks  merely  intermediate  the
transaction; (b)  in floats,  the  exchange  rate  in  principle  changes
continuously  in  response  to  news  and  market  conditions,  unlike  in  an
auction,  where  it is fixed  in  the  inter-auction  period.
In  practice,  both  mechanisms  have  been  equally  open  to  manipulation
by the  authorities. The  interbank  floats  in  Sierra  Leone,  and  to some
extent,  in  Nigeria,  provide  evidence  that  the  exchange  rate  can  be
manipulated  either  through  systems  design  or  unannounced  intervention.
Similarly,  auctions  are  also  manipulable,  by the  authorities  or exporters
and  importers,  if  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  oligopolistic.
In Zambia,  the  manipulation  of the  auction  has been  mainly  by the
authorities.  First,  entry  restrictions  were introduced,  including  proof  of
advance  payment  of various  taxes  and restrictions  on borrowing  to- 33 -
participate  in the  auction. As a result,  several  bids  were  disqualified  in
some  auctions,  artificially  appreciating  the  exchange  rate.  Second,  the
auction  switched  from  a cash  to a commitment  basis,  implying  that  funds  in
excess  of what  could  be sustained  were being  auctioned  off. Neither  of
these  interventions  stabilized  the  exchange  rate,  or stemmed  its  depre-
ciation,  for  long. Even  the  switch  from  a marginal  to a  Dutch  pricing
mechanism,  which  was  motivated  by the idea  that  the  marginal  auction  had  a
"depreciation"  bias,  did  not  alter  the  path  of the  exchange  rate.  19/
The  most significant  development  following  the  auction  has  been  a
big  jump  in the  fiscal  deficit/GDP  ratio  and  hence,  the  dependence  on the
inflation  tax,  as  Table  4 attests. The rise  in the  fiscal  deficit/GDP  ratio
following  the  auction  is  remarkable.  Moreover,  this  is  not  due  to a  tax
collection  problem. To the  contrary,  Zambia  has one  of the  highest  tax
revenue/GDP  ratios  in sub-Saharan  Africa  (Shalizi,  Gandhi  and  Ehdaie
(1985)). The  expenditure/GDP  ratio  virtually  doubled  in 1986  relative  to
1985.
While  a detailed  analysis  of this  phenomenon  is  pursued  elsewhere
(Panayotacos  (1987)),  the  lesson  that  emerges  is clear: exchange  rate
reform  without  fiscal  reform  will  not  work. Moreover,  switching  to a float
could  exacerbate  an already  difficult  budgetary  situation.- 34 -
Table  4s  ZAMBIA-BLACK  MARKET  PREMIUM,  DEFICITS AND INFLATION
1980-1986
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
Premium
Period  Average  1.70  1.55  1.47  1.29  1.40  1.72  1.24
end-of-period  1.70  1.38  1.45  1.27  2.00  1.35  1.17
Fiscal  deficit/GDP  (2)  18.52  12.90  18.59  7.34  6.50  17.11  43.59
Revenue  GDP  25.81  23.85  23.93  25.52  22.58  21.39  35.69
Expenditure/GDP  44.33  36.75  42.52  32.87  29.08  39.53  79.28
Current  Account1GDP  (X)
At official
exchange  rate  -13.83 -18.48 -15.86  -6.83  -6.37  -4.20  n.a.
At black  -23.50 -28.64 -23.31  -8.81  -8.92  -7.22  n.a.
market  rate
Terms  of Trade  Xndex  100.00  73.45  53.91  64.15  77.73  76.54  66.58
Base  Money  Growth  (Z)  5.09  -17.50  63.35  0.94  26.44  49.88  52.00a/
Inflation-CPI  (X)  11.73  14.00  12.49  19.60  20.02  37.43  70.28a/
Depreciation  (X)
Official  -0.60  9.19  6.45  25.78  30.30  33.88  169.17
black  market  -9.08  6.62  -4.74  22.16  48.75  119.32  70.21
Sources  and  Notes: Black  market  exchange  rates  are  from  the  World  Currency
Yearbook. Official  rates,  inflation,  fiscal  data  and  base  money (lines
14+22a-26d)  are from  IFS. Fiscal  data  for  1985-86  and  terms  of trade  are
staff  estimates  based  on  official  data. Depreciation  is  defined  as
percentage  changes  in period  averages.
a/  estimate.- 35 -
IV.  CONCLUDING  REHARKS
Policy  Conditionalitys  The  Budget  and  Exchange  Rate  Arrangements
Paradoxically,  the  first  step  in  exchange  rate  reform  for high  *"
countries  may  have  to  be a fiscal  one:  recasting  the  budget  to fix  the  size
of the  implicit  tax  revenues  from  exports  via  the  premium. The  tax-subsidy
redistribution  within  the  private  sector  as a result  of foreign  exchange
rationing  is  also important.  This involves  identifying  the  potential
gainers  (e.g.,  agriculture)  and  losers  (e.g.,  commerce,  protected
manufacturing  using  imported  inputs)  in the  event  of  unification. Such
identification  will  make plain  the  political  pressure  points  likely  to
emerge  upon  unification.
Four  distinct  issues  arise:  (1)  Can  government  spending  be
justifiably  reduced?  (2)  Is there  an equitable  distribution  of the  tax
burden  based  on  Ramsey-type  considerations?  (3)  Are existing  tax  instruments
apart  from  the  premium  and  rate  of inflation  being  used  to the  hilt,  or are
the  latter  being  used  as the  easy  way out?  20/  And (4),  if  the  export  tax  is
being  used in  lieu  of  a land  tax,  or  profits  tax,  which  are  more  difficult
to  collect,  is the  optimal  export  tax  zero,  as implied  by unification?  21/
In conjunction  with the  preceding  analysis,  these  ideas  suggest  a
changed  emphasis  in  loan  conditionality.  Where  unification  is  an issue,
conditionality  and  technical  assistance  with respect  to the  budget  might  be
more  appropriate  than  conditionality  directly  related  to  exchange  rate
arrangements,  suggesting  a stronger  role  for  public  expenditure  reviews  and
tax  reform. The  length  of the  loan  is  also important,  since  fiscal  reform
takes  time:  improving  information  flows,  perhaps  negotiating  new  contracts
with  MNCe in  the  mineral  sector,  gradual  elimination  of subsidies,  review- 36 -
and  restructuring  of public  investments  and  expenditure,  etc. A short-term
loan  focused  purely  on exchange  rate  unification,  e.g.,  adopting  an auction
or interbank  float,  worsens  the  problem  of post-unification  inflations  the
government  must  not  only  replace  the  lost  revenue  from  exports,  but  also
repay  the  loan  on short  order.
Summing  Up? Some  Guidelines  for  the  Transition
The  black  market  premium  on foreign  exchange  is interpreted  as a
tax  on exports,  thereby  setting  up a trade-off  between  the  premium  and  the
rate  of inflation  in financing  fiscal  deficits. In  order  to depreciate  the
real  exchange  rate  and stimulate  exports,  the  premium  must be reduced.
Further,  for  a given  real  deficit  and  plausible  initial  conditions,
inflation  will rise  upon  unification  of official  and  black  market  exchange
rates:  the loss  in revenues  from  the  premium  is replaced  by a  higher  tax  on
money.
The  analytical  ideas  are  illustrated  with recent  country  experience
in Sub-Saharan  Africa. The  results  apply  when the  premium  is large--much
larger  than  explicable  by capital  controls  alone--so  that  the  revenue  and
redistributive  implications  are  significant.  Typically,  trade  transactions
are  strictly  rationed  via import  licenses,  so  that  at the  margin,  the  black
market  rate  applies  to  both  capital  and  trade  transactions.  The  asset
demand  for  foreign  exchange  is satisfied  via the  black  market.
The real  deficit  can rise  upon  unification  for  two  reasonst  first,
the  higher  inflation  that  results  make it  difficult  to  maintain  real  tax
revenues  (Tanzi  (1977));  second,  rent  seekers  may lobby  successfully  to get
the  implicit  subsidies  they  were receiving  through  import  licenses  at the
official  exchange  rate  under  the  erstwhile  regime  converted  into  explicit
subsidies.- 37 -
The  main  policy  conclusion  is  that  if  policy  credibility  is  low  and
initial  level  of the  premium  high,  with significant  revenue  and
redistributive  implications,  the  pace  of reform  should  be set  by the
feasible  speed  of fiscal  reform. Accelerating  rates  of depreciation  above
prevailing  inflation  in the  absence  of credible  fiscal  reform  could  raise
the  black  market  premium  as a result  of pre-emptive  portfolio  shifts  into
dollars,  thereby  jeopardizing  the  survival  of both  fiscal  and  exchange  rate
reform. Moreover,  such  policy  will  not achieve  real  depreciation  unless  the
premium  falls. Likewise,  overnight  adoption  of floats  is  likely  to  meet
with considerable  political  and  social  opposition  as inflation  rises,
creating  the  possibility  of policy  reversals  aa evidenced  by recent  events
in Sierra  Leone,  Somalia  and  Zambia. The  "best"  route,  consequently,  might
be to gradually  relax  rationing,  accompanying  this  with discrete
devaluations,  with the  pace  of reform  being  set  by the  sp.ed  of fiscal
reform.
Some  additional  guidelines  might  be  helpful. First,  commercial
transactions  can  be transferred  to  the  black  market. Such  legitimization  of
the  black  market  could  be an important  step  in eventual  unification  and  the
removal  of rationing. If the  goal  is  to ultimately  have  a floating
interbank  market,  commercial  banks  could  be permitted  to  buy foreign
exchange  from  the  black  market  and  resell  it to importers  at  a market  rate.
Second,  in  many instances,  foreign  currency  denominated  accounts
are  created  in the  domestic  banking  system  to encourage  capital  reflows,
i.e.,  the  return  of  money  invested  by private  citizens  abroad. The  nature
of these  accounts  is important. For  example,  are  these  going  to  be
checking,  or savir,gs  accounts?  Are  withdrawals  going  to  be  made in local,  or
foreign  currency?  Could  such  accounts  compete  with local  currency  checking
accounts  for  holding  transactions  balances?- 38 -
Permitting  imports  through  the  black  market  provides  a channel  for
repatriating  dollars  held abroad. Foreign  currency  denominated  accounts  do
not  augment  official  reserves. They  merely  make it  easier  and  cheaper  to
hold foreign  financial,  rather  than  domestic  financial,  assets. By
increasing  substitutability  between  domestic  and  foreign  assets,  such
accounts  lower  the  base for  the  inflation  tax,  calling  for  a higher  rate  of
inflation  for  a  given  real  fiscal  deficit. Introducing  such  accounts
therefore  needs  to be  carefully  considered.
Third,  should  dual  official  rates  - as distinct  from  the  black
market  rate  - be adopted  in the  transition? In  particular,  a two-tier
system  with a fixed  (and  more  appreciated)  first-tier  rate,  and  a floating
narket-determined  second-tier  rate?  If adopted,  the  dual  system  should  be
designed  in a  way that  incentives  for  new  economic  ventures  and  investments
are  governed  solely  by the  floating,  market-determined  rate. This  can  be
done  by letting  the  floating  rate  apply  to all  commercial  transactions,
including  those  of state-owned  enterprises  and  restricting  the  fixed  rate  to
purely  government  transactions  and  foreign  interest  payments  on existing,
but  not  new,  deut.
Fourth,  the  transition  provides  an  opportunity  to  design  and
implement  mechanisms  that  will speed  up information  flows  in the  domestic
banking  system  and  the  various  ministries; This  will ensure  that
information  on  key  macroeconomic  variables  such  as government  spending,
domestic  credit  to the  government  and  private  sector,  money  growth  rates  and
price  data  are  available  punctually. Such  data  are  basic  inputs  that  must
be available  in timely  fashion  to  market  participants,  in  addition  to  other
data,  such  as terms  of trade  movements.- 39 -
Most importantly,  fiscal  reform  needs  to be designed  and
implemented  in a credible  and  sustainable  manner,  with a clear  assessment  of
the  taxes  and  subsidies  implicit  in the  dual  exchange  rate  regime.
Lastly,  it  would  be incorrect  to conclude  from  this  study  that  a
developing  country  should  never  float  its  currency. This  decision  should
depend  upon  the  credibility  of accompanying  fiscal  reform  and  the  initial
size  of the  premium. Even  a country  that  follows  the  Ghanaian  route
described  above  will,  at some  stage,  need to  float  its  currency  to achieve
unification.  At a  minimum,  the  rationing  of commercial  transactions  has  to
be eventually  eliminated. It is  difficult  to think  of doing  this  on a
sustained  basis  with fixed  exchange  rates. Once  unification  with or  without
capital  controls  is attained,  however,  there  remains  the  decision  of  whether
to  continue  with  a float  as a  permanent  mechanism. The  empirical  experience
of developing  countries  over  the  next  few  years  should  give some  insights
into  this  issue;  but  this  issue  should  not  be separated  from  the  inflation
tax  and  the  credible  sustainability  of fiscal  reform.- 40 -
FOOTNOTES
1.  Subject  to the  provision  that  the  float  on the  trade  account  is free
of official  manipulation.
2.  These  results  are  developed  heuristically  here.  A rigorous  analytical
treatment  may be found  in  Pinto  (1987  b).
3.  Not  only  is this  assumption  realistic,  but  it is  analytically
justifiable  given  rationing,  and  enables  a consistent  comparison  of
the  dual  and  unified  regimes,  as  we shall  see  later.
4.  The  approach  here follows  Kharas  and  Pinto  (1987).
5.  This  and the  next  two  sections  are  based  on Pinto  (1986,  1987b). Some
of the  basic  model  features  come  from  Lizondo  (1984,  1987).
6.  In addition,  there  is a spending  function  linking  I to  wealth. See
Pinto  (1987b).
7.  Suppose  the  curve  BB  was completely  above  the  horizontal  line,  t-l.
Then  financing  the  deficit  entirely  through  the  inflation  tax  would
not  be feasible  and  unification  (0-1,  i.e.,  b=e)  would  create  serious
stability  problems  (see,  for  example,  Kiguel  (1987)).
8.  Notice  that rh(g 0 )>1rh(g). This  is  because  to the  right  of A, 1>1  s0
that  a lower  rate  of inflation  is required  to generate  the  higher
seignorage  corresponding  to g1>g 0. Further,  of the  dual  equilibria
upon  unification,  the  low  inflation  equilibrium  is saddle-point  stable
and  the  high inflation  equilibrium  completely  locally  stable  under
rational  expectations  (see  Pinto  (1987b)).
9.  This  section  summarizes  chapter  II of Pinto  (1987a). In  particular,
much of the  important  and  interesting  institutional  detail  may  be
found  there.
10.  Formulating  exchange  rate  adjustments  based  on the  difference  between
the  actual  and  some  postulated  equilibrium  level  of the  official  real
exchange,  defined  as  the  exchange  rate  adjusted  for  foreign  relative
to  domestic  prices,  was  common  in  1983. This  approach  included  the
idea  that  for  high inflation  countries,  the  rate  of crawl  be allowed
to  exceed  prevailing  inflation  (see  Johnson  et al., (1985)). Edwards
(1985)  emphasizes  that  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  changes  over  time
and is  endogenous,  depending  upon fiscal,  monetary,  external  debt  and
trade  policy. Deciding  what this  level  is  based  on a  historical  time
series  is  more art  than  science.
11.  A discussion  of  Nigerian  economic  policy  during  and  soon  after  the  oil
boom  may be found  in  Pinto  (1987c).
12.  An excellent  account  of the  oil  boom  and  its  aftermath  is contained  in
"Structural  Adjustment  Programme,  July  1986  - June 1988",  a  Nigerian
government  document  presented  to the  Loncon  Club in  June,  1986. This- 41 -
insightful  paper  discusses  key corrective  measures  in  the  areas  of
trade  and  exchange  rate  policy,  public  investment,  agriculture  and
externai  debt.
13.  Given  the low  level  of inflation,  and  hence  of the  inflation
elasticity  of the  demand  for  nairas,  plus  the  government's  being  a  net
seller  of dollars,  it is likely  that  both responses  arrested  the
growth  of the  premium  as it rose  irn  response  to the  collapse  of oil
prices  (sharp  decline  in  px--see  section  II).
14.  Paras.  38  and 39  of the "Structural  Adjustment  Programme,  July 1986  -
June  1988",  provide  the  rationale  for  moving  to a  market  exchange
rate,  based  on eliminating  the  economic  costs  of the  import  licensing
system.
15.  One  possible  motive  is to increase  the  flow  in  the  free  market. The
other  more important  one  is  to avoid  increasing  the  degree  of
substitutability  between  domestic  and  foreign  financial  assets,  which
would  reduce  the  base  for  the  inflation  tax.
16.  Sierra  Leone  experimented  briefly  with an auction  in  1982 (Krumm
(1986)  contains  details)  before  reverting  to  a fixed  peg  to the  U.S.
dollar  until  the  float  in  June,  1986.
17.  By issuing  non-interest,  or relative  to inflation,  low  nominal
interest  bearing  debt such  as currency  and  treasury  bills,  the
government  inflicts  a capital  loss  on the  holders  of its  outstanding
stock  of liabilities,  thereby  making  a revenue  gain. It is  necessary
to  make a case-by-case  determination  of the  components  of base  money,
which  traditionally  includes  only  the  liabilities  of  the  central  bank,
namely,  currency  outside  banks  and  commercial  bank reserves.
18.  This  description  reflects  the  prevailing  institutional  differences
between  the  two  mechanisms  as actually  implemented  in  various
countries.
19.  For  details,  see  Panayotacos  (1987). If it  is believed  that  the
bidding  strategies  of  participants  depend  upon  the  pricing  mechanism,
one  possibility  is  to randomize  over  the  marginal  and  Dutch  pricing
rules  after  the  bids  are  in.  However,  Zambia's  experience  i;idicates
that  consistency  between  fiscal  and  exchange  rate  policy  is  at least
as important  as the  auction  design  itself.
20.  See  Aizenman  (1986)  for  a  welfare  analysis  of a related  problem.
21.  Suppose  #=3  to start  with,  implying  a tax  rate  of 67 percent,  and  that
the  export  is  bought  by a commodity  board  which  sets  domestic  prices
with reference  to  the  official  exchange  rate. Upon  unification,  the
government  might  find  it  difficult  to justify  an explicit  tax  of 67
percent. It  may  however,  decide  upon  a lower  tax  of say,  15  percent.
This  has the  advantage  of eliminating  the  misallocation  costs
associated  with  cheap  imports  in  the  erstwhile  dual  regime,  since
importers  must  now  pay  the  unified  rate.- 42 -
Appendix  11
Proof  that  the  Production  Possibility  Frontier  (PPF)  is  Concave
The  key to  understanding  this  proof  ls  the  recognition  that  there  are
essentially  two  goods: the  home  good (H)  and  the  export  good (X). In stage
one,  the  production  levels  of  H and  X are  chosen  using  the  PPF  and  relative
price  line.  In stage  two,  total  exports,  X, are  distributed  between  the
official  and  black  markets  by equating  marginal  returns  in the  two  markets.
Technology H - La Ila  ,  ae[o,l),  where  L is labor  and  I, imported
inputs.
X - L  - L,  where  L  is  the  given  endowment  of labor.
Steady  State  The  balance  of  payments  equation  (eq.  (4))  is:
PxX - I +  g +  F,  where
g is  government  imports  ($),  Px is the  $-price  of exports  and  F is  private
sector  dollar  accumulation.  In steady-state,  therefore,  I - pxX  - g.
Substituting  into  H - La I  gives  the  steady-state  technological
relationship  between  H and  X:
H - (L  - X)a (pxX  - g1 -a
Straightforward  differentiation  can  be used  to show  that  H.,  <  0, so  that  H is  a
strictly  concave  function  of  X.  Further,  H - 0  when  X - gIpx  or  when  X - E.
We require  that  PxE  >  g, i.e.,  that  the  maximum  feasible  supply  of dollars
exceed  the  government's  requirements.  The  PPF is  shown  graphically  in Fig.  1 in
the  text.
At X - X*  - al  - a)L  +  a(g/pX))g  Hx  - 0.
1/  Further  technical  details  are  available  in Pinto  (1987b).- 43 -
Since  domestic  residents  consume  only  home  goods,  it  follows  that  the  optimal
point  to produce  at is  X*,  where  H is  maximized. The  solution  to the
optimization  problem  (eq.  (1)  in  Pinto (1987b))  gives  XoPt  *  L  - L -
l(l-a) +  a(g/px)]j/(l  - a  + a#),  where *  (b/e)  is  the  black  market  premium.
Clearly,  XOPt  <  X*  with XOPt  - X*  when  #  - 1, i.e.,  the  exports  tax  via  the
premium  is  removed. In fact,  Hx(X  - XOPt)  - bpx(l  - lI#)/pH,  which  is  zero  when
#  - 1.  So long  as  #  >  1,  XoPt  <  X* and  consumption  of home  goods  is less  than
its  maximum  feasible  level  corresponding  to  X*.  Not  only  does  this  capture  the
production  distortion  as the  result  of the  tax  on  exports  via  t, it  also
captures  the  notion  of import  compression  and  its  effect  on lower
GDP growth  as a result  of stunted  exports.- 44 -
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